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Learning Objectives

By the end of this module, you will be able to:

  • Distinguish legal sovereignty, which depends on operator jurisdiction, from data residency, which depends on region
  • Scope each BSI recognition to its credential type, date, services and locations, and avoid platform-wide claims
  • Separate data-center-level credentials from service-level credentials when you build a compliance argument
  • Apply residency and compliance as a filter that you set before workloads land
  • Evaluate Confidential VM as the control for data in use

Unit 1.4: Sovereignty and Compliance as Design Inputs

Introduction

Compliance is usually treated as a review step at the end of a design. On IONOS CLOUD, that order fails, because the decisions that compliance depends on are made first and cannot be reversed: the VDC location, the services in the data path, and the trust model for sensitive workloads. If you choose them without the compliance filter, you discover the problem when the auditor asks for evidence.

This unit treats sovereignty and compliance as design inputs. It separates three questions that are often blurred: whose law applies, which credential covers which service where, and how far the operator can see into your workload.

1. Sovereignty Is a Property of Jurisdiction

1.1 Region Is Not Enough

EU legal sovereignty means that data is subject only to the laws and legal protections of EU member states. In a cloud context, the infrastructure provider, the data centers and the governing contracts are all based in the EU, so that foreign entities, such as those under the US CLOUD Act, cannot legally bypass European privacy protections. The US CLOUD Act allows US law enforcement to compel US-based technology companies, by warrant or subpoena, to produce requested data regardless of whether that data is stored in the US or abroad. European organisations subject to the GDPR must review these jurisdictional implications before they proceed.

The architectural consequence follows from the definition. Choosing an EU region of a US-based provider fixes where the data sits, but it does not change who can be compelled to produce it. Residency and sovereignty are two different properties, and a regulated design needs both.

1.2 The IONOS CLOUD Position, Stated Precisely

The IONOS CLOUD services in Germany are provided and operated by IONOS SE, which is the subject of the BSI IT-Grundschutz certificate described below. IONOS CLOUD is a founding member of the Gaia-X project, whose goal includes independence from services that are subject to the US CLOUD Act. Under the IONOS CLOUD Data Processing Agreement, processing takes place in the United Kingdom or a Member State of the European Union, or in another contracting state of the European Economic Area, unless a transfer to a third country becomes necessary to provide the service; in that case, the processor must meet the relevant data protection requirements for that transfer.

Precision matters in both directions. IONOS CLOUD also operates locations outside the EU, including the United Kingdom and the United States. A sovereign design is therefore not automatic; it is the result of choosing the right location and the right services.

2. The Two BSI Recognitions and Their Scopes

2.1 C5: An Attestation, Not a Certificate

The Cloud Computing Compliance Criteria Catalogue (C5) of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) is assessed by an independent auditor, and the result is an attestation (Testat). IONOS CLOUD received the C5:2020 Type 1 attestation on 28 May 2026. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) confirmed that 136 controls, the 121 basic criteria of BSI C5:2020 plus additional IONOS CLOUD-specific controls, are appropriately designed. The engagement followed ISAE 3000, and the scope covers 33 services in 10 service clusters. The attestation report is available on request.

For design, two facts follow. First, a Type 1 attestation confirms the design of the controls; it is the credential type you name in your compliance mapping. Second, C5 scope is per service. The AI Model Hub, for example, falls within the scope of BSI C5. For every other service in your data path, request the attestation report and confirm that the service is listed before you cite C5 for it.

2.2 IT-Grundschutz: An ISO 27001 Certificate With a Narrower Scope

The second recognition is an ISO 27001 certificate on the basis of IT-Grundschutz, certificate number BSI-IGZ-0730-2025. The BSI issued it in Bonn on 14 September 2025. It is valid until 13 September 2028, on condition that the annual surveillance audits from 14 September 2025 complete with a positive result. Its scope is the provision and operation of IONOS Cloud Services in Germany by IONOS SE, comprising:

  • The ISMS of the IONOS Group and the infrastructure for the IONOS Cloud Services in Germany
  • Compute Engine, Managed Kubernetes and IONOS Cloud Object Storage, including provisioning
  • The IONOS Backbone

The scope covers the own data centers and the co-locations in Frankfurt and Berlin. Note what is outside it: Cubes and Backup Service are not covered by IT-Grundschutz, and for Object Storage the certification of the Berlin region eu-central-3 is still pending. The certificate applies only to the stated scope and only together with the full certification report, which IONOS CLOUD provides on request.

2.3 Combined Claim and Its Limits

IONOS CLOUD is the first German cloud provider to hold both the C5 attestation and the IT-Grundschutz certification of the BSI (as of May 2026). That claim is true at the provider level. It does not mean that every service carries both credentials. The two scopes differ, so you map each service in your design to each credential separately.

3. Data-Center-Level Versus Service-Level Credentials

A data-center credential describes the facility and its operator. A service credential describes how a cloud service is run. They answer different audit questions, and one never substitutes for the other.

The following table lists the public cloud locations, their operators and the certifications of each data center.

Country / Location Operator Certifications
Germany / Berlin (DE/TXL) IONOS CLOUD Group BSI IT-Grundschutz, ISO/IEC 27001
Germany / Frankfurt am Main (DE/FRA/1) Equinix GmbH ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISO 22301, ISO 50001, SOC 1 Type II, SOC 2 Type II, PCI DSS
Germany / Frankfurt am Main (DE/FRA/2) Digital Realty ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISO 22301, ISO 50001, EN 50600
Germany / Karlsruhe (DE/FKB) TelemaxX Telekommunikation GmbH BSI IT-Grundschutz, ISO/IEC 27001
United Kingdom / London (GB/LHR) Virtus Data Centres Ltd. ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISO 50001, ISO 20000, ISAE 3402 compliant, PCI-DSS compliant, BREEAM excellent
United Kingdom / Worcester (GB/BHX) IONOS CLOUD Ltd. Uptime Institute Tier IV, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 50001, PCI-DSS
Spain / Logroño (ES/VIT) Arsys Internet S.L.U. AENOR ecommerce, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 9001, ISO 50001, ENS Conformity, Uptime Tier III, and SAP Certified in Cloud and Infrastructure
France / Paris (FR/PAR) Digital Realty ISO14001, ISO22301, ISO27001, ISO50001, SOC2
USA / Las Vegas (US/LAS) Switch, Inc. ISO/IEC 27001, SSAE 16/ISAE 3402 (SOC1, SOC2), CICA SOC3, PCI-DSS
USA / Newark (US/EWR) QTS Realty Trust, Inc. ISO27001, SOC1, SOC2, PCI-DSS, HIPAA, FISMA
USA / Lenexa (US/MCI) IONOS CLOUD Inc. ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 50001

The Karlsruhe location is not available for the creation of new virtual data centers.

As shown above, facility credentials vary by location and by operator. A PCI DSS or Uptime Tier IV entry belongs to that facility, not to the services that run in it. When you build the evidence pack, cite the facility credential for physical and environmental controls, and the service credential, with its scope, for the cloud service.

4. Residency as a Placement Decision

You specify the location of a VDC only when you first provision it, and you cannot change it afterwards. Reserved IPv4 addresses, snapshots and uploaded private images are bound to their region as well. Residency is therefore decided before any workload lands, and compliance acts as a filter over every later decision:

  1. Location filter: keep only the locations that meet the residency and sovereignty requirement.
  2. Service filter: for each service in the data path, keep it only if the required credential names it in scope.
  3. Facility filter: where the requirement concerns physical controls, check the data-center credentials of the chosen location.
  4. Trust-model filter: where the operator must not be able to read data in use, require Confidential VM (Section 5).

Apply the filters in this order and record the result. Every later module inherits it: a functionally correct choice that fails the service filter is a wrong choice.

5. Data in Use: Confidential VM

Encryption at rest and in transit leave one state open: data while it is being processed. Confidential VM closes it. It runs inside a hardware-enforced Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) based on AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging (AMD SEV-SNP). Memory is encrypted per VM, with keys managed by the AMD Secure Processor, so the hypervisor sees only ciphertext. Instances are built from customer-owned images, and you can run your own attestation to verify the state of the TEE before any secrets or keys are released. That replaces a contractual trust model with one enforced in hardware.

The design inputs are specific. Confidential VM is available in Frankfurt (DE/FRA/2) on AMD EPYC Turin. You deploy and operate the attestation service yourself; IONOS CLOUD does not provide one. vCPU and memory allocations are locked at creation, snapshots are blocked for startup volumes, and cloud-init v1 is not supported. The hardware prevents live migration, so every host-level maintenance event causes downtime, and the architecture must tolerate restarts. Because IONOS CLOUD has no visibility into the encrypted environment, its support cannot assist with in-guest operating system, application or key management issues. Unit 4.1 treats Confidential VM as a compute class.

6. FinCorp: The Compliance Filter

FinCorp applies the filter to its first workloads. The location filter keeps the German locations only. The service filter then shapes the product choices: for the customer-facing compute tier, which must sit within IT-Grundschutz scope, FinCorp chooses Compute Engine rather than Cubes, because Cubes are not covered by IT-Grundschutz. For object archives it uses IONOS Cloud Object Storage, which is within IT-Grundschutz scope. Because Backup Service is outside the IT-Grundschutz scope, the risk office records that gap explicitly against the VM backup control, and FinCorp requests the C5 attestation report to check each service it plans to cite under C5. For the fraud-scoring engine, which processes raw transaction data, the trust-model filter requires Confidential VM in DE/FRA/2, and the team designs that tier to tolerate maintenance restarts.

Decision Summary

Question Credential or control Scope to state Design rule
Whose law applies? Operator jurisdiction and contract Operator entity, location, Data Processing Agreement Choose an EU-operated service in an EU location; residency alone is not sovereignty
Is the service run securely (BSI C5)? C5:2020 Type 1 attestation, 28 May 2026 33 services in 10 service clusters; confirm each service in the report Cite C5 only for services the report lists
Is the service run securely (IT-Grundschutz)? ISO 27001 on the basis of IT-Grundschutz, BSI-IGZ-0730-2025, 14 September 2025 Compute Engine, Managed Kubernetes, IONOS Cloud Object Storage in Germany Cubes and Backup Service are outside this scope
Is the facility secure? Data-center certifications Per location and operator Never cite a facility credential as a service credential
Where does the data live? VDC location Fixed at first provisioning Decide before any workload lands
Can the operator see data in use? Confidential VM (AMD SEV-SNP) DE/FRA/2 on AMD EPYC Turin Use it for the workloads that need cryptographic isolation; design for restarts

Summary

Sovereignty depends on who operates the service and under which law, not only on where the data sits. The BSI recognitions are two different credentials with different types, dates and service scopes, and facility credentials are a third, separate layer. Residency is fixed when you first provision a VDC, so compliance must act as a filter before the first workload lands. Confidential VM adds hardware-enforced isolation for data in use, with its own placement and operational limits.

Key Points:

  • An EU region of a US-based provider fixes residency but not jurisdiction; sovereignty needs both.
  • C5:2020 Type 1 (28 May 2026) is an attestation; cite it per service, confirmed against the report.
  • The IT-Grundschutz certificate covers Compute Engine, Managed Kubernetes and IONOS Cloud Object Storage in Germany; Cubes and Backup Service are outside it.
  • Data-center certifications vary by location and operator and never stand in for service credentials.
  • Confidential VM runs in DE/FRA/2, needs your own attestation service if you use attestation, and cannot live-migrate.

Important Terminology:

  • Attestation (Testat): an auditor's assurance report on a control system, as used for C5; distinct from a certificate.
  • Type 1: a C5 attestation that confirms the controls are appropriately designed.
  • Trusted Execution Environment (TEE): a hardware-isolated execution context whose memory the host cannot read.